Where should government-NGO relations go next?
 
- 서유경 (영교 80/32회) / 경희사이버대학교 교수 -

It is no secret that civil society in Korea emerged directly from a series of social movements for democratization in the 1980s and subsequent civic movements in the 1990s.
In particular, the 1987 pro-democracy uprising by middle-class citizens, which sociologists often compare to the May 1968 incident in Paris, brought about an accommodating social milieu for progressive political ideals on top of strong enthusiasm for a plebian democracy.

The major actors - students, workers, environmentalists, pacifists, women - of the 1987 citizen uprising comprised the backbone of Korean civil society. Most of them found new roles as members of civil society or the NGO sector.

Nevertheless, their political significance was not lightly valued by civilian governments, who felt that they owed the reinstated democratic republic to those former revolutionaries. Political parties, too, turned to their practical experience and wisdom to set policy agenda.

In limited cases, political parties even officially nominated some of them to stand for local seats in the general elections. A few female activists were able to place themselves high on the party proportional representation candidate lists and eventually entered the National Assembly.

As such, the NGO sector served not only as a policy provider but as a recruiting pool for national politics, and acted like a surrogate political party.

To be sure, it appears that government-NGO relations have been gradually evolving over the successive four civilian governments in the past two decades. Under the Roh Tae-woo administration, relations between the government and NGOs began to take shape in an initially fragile form against the backdrop of the 1987 citizen uprising for a plebiscite democracy.

Under the Kim Young-sam administration, relations developed in a more meaningful way. A significant number of seats on various government advisory committees and decision-making processes were reserved for the representatives of the NGO sector. In this way, the government and the NGO sector actually were able to set up a kind of policy partnership. It was a most drastic step taken by the then "civilian government." The Kim Dae-jung administration made a much more substantive contribution to the NGO sector than its predecessors. Above all, it underwent a thorough revision of the Law to Support Nonprofit Civil Organizations, putting aside some 15 trillion won ($16.8 billion) annually for the purpose of financing the projects to be proposed by the NGOs. In addition, some of the able NGO activists started to move over to some government posts. In this regard, government-NGO relations shifted from a policy partnership to an administrative cooptation.

This fashion continued under the incumbent Roh Moo-hyun administration. The appointment of Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, which was followed by other women aides with specific work experience in the NGO sector, apparently spoke itself for the intimacy of the government-NGO relation. On the other hand, however, the 15 trillion won support fund was cut down to 10 trillion won in 2004 and from 2007 it will not be given to some NGOs involved in violent and illegal protests against government policies such as the recent FTA with the United States.

It is commonly known that the Korean NGO sector presently faces three difficulties: its much lessened political influence, lowered social recognition and ever-declining membership. As we know, the political influence and social recognition of the NGOs reached a peak with the vast success of the 2000 Civil Action for the General Elections campaign against some corrupt and unqualified candidates on their "fatwa" list. Yet this campaign was fined by the Supreme Court for being illegal and its sequel at the 2004 general election campaign period was not so successful in attracting public attention as its predecessor had done.

Another factor which apparently damaged its political influence as a radical policy agenda setter was the emergence of the Democratic Labor Party. It entered the National Assembly with 10 seats after the 2004 general election.

Its policy area largely coincides with that of the NGO sector and the latter no longer could monopolize such radical political agenda as social justice. In short, the official appearance of a leftist political party had a negative effect on the NGO sector`s policy-providing function. This technically means the end of its political period.

As for diminishing social reputation, there have been several factors arisen from the sector itself. Some shameful stories concerning sexual harassment, public money embezzlement, and forced goods purchase for donations contributed a great deal to eroding the dimensions of its integrity and work ethics. Obviously, less volunteer workers and less dues money are available for the NGOs now than several years ago because of their tarnished reputation. What remains to be done? How can we save the NGO sector from its present dire situation? Let`s face the fact that the NGOs are not charity organizations, that the NGO people are not voluntary workers regardless of our prejudice about them, and that they are breadwinners like everybody else working in other sectors. Nevertheless it is generally an impoverished, underqualified, and strikingly feminized economic sector in Korea. There are reasons for this.

First, a regular civic organization`s full-time worker (or "gansa" in Korean) gets paid more or less 1 million won per month, only half of the initial salary of a college graduate who has just joined the mainstream economic sector in Korea.

Considering the notoriously dear costs of living in Seoul, this 1 million won monthly salary is not a sufficient amount at all for an average spending adult person to manage to survive a month. It becomes even harder for the person if he (or she) has a family to support financially. As a result, impoverishment has become a byword for the NGOs.

Second, as the income level of the NGO sector is very low, ordinary commonsensical college graduates do not choose the sector as their first choice of employment. Hence the applicants for the sector tend to be with less qualifications, experience, and ability than those who have already gone into the mainstream economic sector. More women than men are likely to go into the sector for the same reason - the low levels of income. Thus, it is only natural that the rate of turnovers be very high.

This, however, does not mean to dishonor those respectable people who in spite of the financial inconveniences have decided to go into the NGO sector in the first place and stayed there since with a strong personal commitment to their work.

Even for those who wish to work in the NGO sector, however, their preference is clear to the extent that those who with better qualifications and more abilities mostly opt for some major NGOs such as the People Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Coalition for Economic Justice, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, or the Women21 (KWAU).

All this brings me to my last point. Believe it or not, the NGO sector has been depoliticized little by little in order to adapt to the changing conditions in Korea`s notional political configurations during the past 20 years. In this connection a gradual shift in government-NGO relations has been observed.

A most striking feature of the recent change in these relations is the government`s willingness to back away from any policy partnership with the NGO sector in the political dimension but to contract out social welfare services to the NGO sector. Many unemployed people, young and old, around us have already started applying for such temporary social workers` positions offered by the NGOs, who have made some sub-contractual arrangements with the government.

What worries me about these newly developed government-NGO relations is a possible situation in which the NGOs become permanently dependent upon government funding and in turn give up their organization`s objectives and independence for the sake of the government contract. What I really fear is a situation in which "the British disease" in the last century comes over here and affects Korean folks in this century.

From this same point of view, the annual 10 trillion won support fund could also be seen in this light. The way this government money is allotted seems not to have been adopted with a long-term view. In my opinion, under the present arrangements, the 10 trillion won is just wasted away each year with various one-time events proposed by the NGOs.

In conclusion, what I want to suggest here is that this bulky support fund be systematically invested in building the socio-economic infrastructure for the NGO sector economy and in improving the life conditions of its workers, not by giving away lottery-type project money, but by taking some substantive institutional measures.

It needs urgent attention because the impoverished, underqualified, feminized NGO sector is on the risk of selling its revolutionary spirit to make this world a better place to live in, not to mention its independence. I do not want to see "the British disease" take hold on our soil.

By Suh You-kyung The views expressed here are the author`s own. She can be reached at sykphil@khcu.ac.kr - Ed.

[코리아헤럴드 2007-05-22]